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Motivation-Framework. We are interested in the behavior of packet-switched networks in which packets arrive dynamically at the nodes and they are routed in discrete time steps across the links. Recent years have witnessed a vast amount of work on analyzing packet-switched networks under non-probabilistic assumptions (rather than stochastic ones); We work within a model of worst-case continuous packet arrivals, originally proposed by Borodin et al. [3] and termed Adversarial Queueing Theory to reflect the assumption of an adversarial way of packet generation and path determination. * A major issue that arises in such a setting is that of stability-will the number of packets in the network remain bounded at all times? Besides the existence or not of upper bounds on the packet delays, a complementary question concerning stability is whether stability guarantees that there are small bounds on packet delays. The answer to these questions may depend on the rate of injecting packets into the network, the capacity of the links, which is the rate at which a link forwards outgoing packets, and the protocol that is used to resolve the conflict when more than one packet wants to cross a given link in a single time step. We study these questions considering that packets are injected by an adversary (rather than by an oblivious randomized process) and capacities are chosen by the same adversary in a dynamic way.
Most studies of packet-switched networks assume that one packet can cross a network link in a single time step. This assumption is well motivated when we assume that all network links are identical. However, a packet-switched network can contain different types of links, which is common especially in large-scale networks like Internet. Then, it is well motivated to assign a capacity to each link that takes on values from the integer set [1, C] with C > 1. If C is a large integer, we can consider approximately as a link failure the assigning of unit capacity to a link and the assigning of capacity C as the proper service rate. Therefore, the study of protocol stability under this model of dynamically changing capacities can be considered as an approximation of the fault-tolerance of a network where links can temporarily fail (zero capacity).
In this work we consider the impact on performance bounds and stability properties if the adversary besides the packet injections in paths which it determines, it also can set the capacities of network edges in each time step. This subfield of study was initiated by Borodin et al. in [4] . Note that we continue to assume uniform packet sizes. Furthermore, we consider greedy contention-resolution protocols (all of which enjoy simple implementations)-always advance a packet across a queue (but one packet at each discrete time step) whenever there resides at least one packet in the queue, such as LIS (Longest-in-System) that gives priority to the packets that have been for the longest amount of time in the network and SIS (Shortest-in-System) that gives priority to the packets that have been for the shortest amount of time in the network.
Roughly speaking a protocol P is stable [3] on a network G against an adversary A of rate r if there is an integer B (which may depend on G and A) such that the number of packets in the system is bounded at all times by B. Moreover, a a network G is universally stable [3] if every greedy protocol is stable against every adversary of rate less than 1 on G. Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) are universally stable in the more powerful model of general dynamic capacities-each is stable against every adversary of rate less than 1 for every protocol [4, Theorem 3] .
Contribution. We use here the model of dynamic capacities that has been initiated in [4] where link capacities may take on integer values in the interval [1, C] with C > 1 1 under a (w, ρ)-adversary that injects packets at rate ρ with window size w. In this framework, we show:
• The delay of packets on DAGs (where LIS is running on top of them) is upper bounded by O(iwCρ) where i is the level of a node in a DAG (the length of the longest path leading to node v when nodes are ordered by the topological order induced by the graph). We use double-induction on time and the node level to prove it.
• We make this performance bound tight showing a lower bound of Ω(iwCρ) on the packet delay that is suffered by a packet targeted with a node u of level i.
The maximum queue size in this case is (w +1)C. The proof of this result is based on an involved adversarial construction. In a similar way, we prove that SIS has a lower bound of Ω(iwCρ) on the packet delay when it is running on top of DAGs.
• We show two simple results which provide some upper bounds on the allowable rate of injections that still guarantees stability. Specifically, we prove that any arbitrary network running a greedy contention-resolution protocol is stable as long as the injection rate does not exceed
is the length of the 1 The classical Adversarial Queueing Theory corresponds to the case where only one capacity value is available to the adversary. longest path in the network that can be followed by any packet. A slightly improved result is proved for the stability threshold in the case of a special class of greedy protocols, the time priority protocols. Such a protocol is stable on all networks as long as the injection rate of the adversary does not exceed
Roughly speaking, the results that have been obtained in this paper show that the linear performance bounds that have been proved in the classical setting of Adversarial Queueing Theory remain linear when link capacities vary dynamically although the adversary in such environments is more powerful. The only difference is that performance bounds in the dynamic setting have as expense a multiplicative factor of C. The same holds for the stability thresholds that are obtained in this paper for dynamically varying link capacities.
Related Work. Adversarial Queueing Theory was developed by Borodin et al. [3] as a more realistic model that replaces traditional stochastic assumptions in Queueing Theory by more robust, worst-case ones. Adversarial queueing theory received a lot of interest in the study of stability and instability issues (see, e.g., [2, 6, 8, 10, 11] ). The universal stability of various natural greedy protocols (LIS, SIS, NTS (Nearest-to-Source), FTG (Furthest-toGo)) has been established by Andrews et al. [2] . Furthermore, the set of universally stable networks has been wellcharacterized [2, 3] (DAGs, trees, ring).
Performance Bounds for Greedy Protocols. Several universally stable protocols have exponential lower bounds on queue sizes and packet delays (SIS, NTS, FTG) [2] . In an interesting work, Adler and Rosén [1] proved tight polynomial bounds for the stability of LIS on DAGs. Especially, they have shown that LIS on DAGs has linear (in the longest path in the network that can be followed by any packet) queue sizes and packet delays.
Stability Issues in Dynamic Networks. Borodin et al.
in [4] studied for the first time the impact on stability when the edges in a network can have capacities. They proved that many well-known universally stable protocols (SIS, NTS, FTG) do maintain their universal stability when the link capacity is changing dynamically, whereas the universal stability of LIS is not preserved. Also, the universal stability of networks is preserved under this varying context. The study of stability when link capacities change dynamically has been further extended in [9] presenting involved combinatorial constructions of the adversary that lead LIS and certain compositions of universally stable protocols to instability for a threshold of √ 2 − 1.
Model
The model definitions are patterned after those in [3, Section 3], adjusted to reflect the fact that link capacities may vary arbitrarily as in [4, Section 2] (link capacities may take on integer values in the interval [1, C] with C > 1). A routing network is modelled as a directed graph G =(V, E) with |V | = n nodes and |E| = m edges. Each node v ∈ V represents a communication switch and each directed edge e ∈ E represents a link between two switches that delivers packets only in the direction it is oriented. Every switch has a buffer (queue) at the tail of each out-going link and stores there the packets to be sent on the corresponding link.
Time proceeds in discrete steps. New packets, requiring to traverse predetermined paths, can be injected into the network at any time step. A packet is an atomic entity that resides at a node at the end of any step. It must travel along paths in the network from its source to its destination, both of which are nodes in the network. When it reaches its destination, we say that it is absorbed. During each step, a packet may be sent from its current node along one of the outgoing edges from that node. Edges can have different integer capacities, which may or may not vary over time.
Denote C e (t) the capacity of edge e at time step t. That is, we assume that edge e is capable of simultaneously transmitting up to C e (t) packets at time t.
Any packets that wish to travel along an edge e at a particular time step but are not sent wait in a queue for edge e. The delay of a packet is the number of steps spent by the packet while waiting in queues. At each step, an adversary generates a set of requests. A request is a path specifying the route followed by a packet. 2 We say that the adversary generates a set of packets when it generates a set of requested paths. We restrict our study to the case of nonadaptive routing, where the path traversed by each packet is fixed at the time of injection, so that we are able to focus on queueing rather than routing aspects of the problem. There are no computational restrictions on how the adversary chooses its requests in any given time step.
Fix any arbitrary positive integer w ≥ 1. Throughout, for any sequence of time steps T = [t 1 , t 2 ] and for any integer w ≥ 1, denote T ± w the sequence of time steps
For any edge e of the network and any sequence T w of w consecutive time steps, define N (T , e) to be the number of paths injected by the adversary during the time interval T that traverse edge e. For any constant ρ, 0 < ρ ≤ 1, a (w, ρ)-adversary A w,ρ is an adversary that injects packets subject to the following load condition: For every edge e and for every sequence T w of w consecutive time steps, N (T w , e) ≤ ρ τ ∈Tw C(τ ). We say that a (w, ρ)-adversary A w,ρ injects packets at rate ρ with window size w. 
Lemma 2.1 Fix any (w, ρ)-adversary
The assumption that ρ ≤ 1 ensures that it is not necessary a priori that some edge of the network is congested (which would surely happen when ρ > 1).
A contention-resolution protocol specifies, for each pair of an edge e and a time step, which packet among those waiting at the tail of edge e will be moved along edge e. A greedy contention-resolution protocol always specifies some packet to move along edge e if there are packets waiting to use edge e. All these contention-resolution protocols require some tie-breaking rule in order to be unambiguously defined. In this work, whenever we are proving a positive result, we assume that the adversary can break the tie arbitrarily; for proving a negative result, we can assume any well-determined tie breaking rule for the adversary. For simplicity, and in a way similar to that in [2] and in works following it, we omit floors and ceilings from our analysis, and we sometimes count time steps and packets only roughly. This may only result to loosing small additive constants, while it implies a gain in clarity.
LIS on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs)
Upper and lower bounds on the performance of LIS on DAGs appear in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Throughout this section, we will consider DAGs, in which nodes are ordered by the topological order induced by the graph. This order assigns to each node v level i ≥ 0, denoted level (v), such that the longest path leading to node v has length i.
Upper bound
In this section, we present our upper bound on the performance of LIS on directed acyclic graphs. We start by proving:
Proposition 3.1 Consider any packet p injected at time t, and let v be any node of level i ≥ 0 on its path other than its destination node. Then, packet p clears node v by time t + δ(t), where δ(t) > 0 is the least integer such that
Proof: By double induction on i and on t; the outer induction is on i. The basis case and the induction step of the outer induction are shown by an inner induction on t. Throughout, denote e = v, u the edge over which p has to leave v.
For the basis case of the outer induction, assume that i = 0. Note that in this case any packet that has node v on its path must be injected into node v, since node v has level 0. In particular, packet p is injected into node v. By definition of the LIS protocol, it follows that packet p can be delayed at node v only by packets injected into v at times t ≤ t.
We prove the claim for the case i = 0 by an inner induction on t.
For the basis case of the inner induction, assume that t = 1. Since w ≥ 1 while, in this case, max{1, t−w+1} = max{1, 2 − w} = 1, we need to show that packet p clears node v by time 1 + δ(1), where δ(1) > 0 is the least integer such that
Note that since t = 1, packet p can be delayed only by packets injected into v at time step 1 that have edge e on their path. By Corollary 2.2, there are at most ρ 1≤τ ≤w C(τ ) such packets (including p itself). It follows that p will clear v by time 1 + δ(1) where δ(1) is the least integer such that
For the induction step, consider any time step t > 1. Consider any packet p injected into v at time t ≤ t − (2w − 1)Cρ. Since t < t, induction hypothesis implies that p clears node v by time t + δ(t ), where δ(t ) is the least integer such that
We continue to prove:
Proof:
By definition of δ(t ), it suffices to show that t ≤τ ≤t
Since C(t) ≥ 1 for all time steps t, it follows that
Since C(t) ≤ C for all time steps t, it follows that
This completes the proof of the inner induction (on t).
The basis case of the outer induction (on i) is now complete. We now proceed to the induction step of the outer induction. We prove the claim for the case i > 0 by an inner induction on t ≥ 1. By definition of the LIS protocol, it follows that packet p can be delayed at node v only by packets injected either into v or into other nodes that are predecessors of v in the network G at times t ≤ t.
For the basis case of the inner induction, assume that t = 1. Note that since t = 1, packet p can be delayed at node v only by packets injected at time t = 1 that have edge e on their path. We distinguish between two cases:
• Assume first that packet p is injected into node v. Note that since t = 1, packet p can be delayed only by packets injected at time step 1 that have e on their path. By Corollary 2.2, there are at most ρ 1≤τ ≤w C(τ ) such packets (including p itself). It follows that p will clear v by time 1 + δ(1) where δ(1) is the least integer, such that 1≤τ ≤1+δ(1) C(τ ) ≥ ρ 1≤τ ≤w C(τ ) as needed.
• Assume now that packet p is injected into some node different than v. Thus, p arrives at node v over an edge (w, v) for some node w such that level (w) < level (v) = i. Denote k = level (w). By the induction hypothesis (on i), packet p clears node w by time 1 + δ(1), where δ(1) is the least integer, such that
Thus, packet p arrives at node v by time 1 + δ (1) . Note that packet p can be delayed (at node v) only by packets that are injected at time t = 1 that have e on their path. By Corollary 2.2, there are at most ρ 1≤τ ≤w C(τ ) such packets. It follows that p will clear v by time 1 + δ(1) + δ(1 + δ(1)), where δ(1 + δ (1) ) is the least integer, such that
Define now δ(1) to be the least integer, such that
It remains to prove that packet p clears node v by time δ (1) 
H o w e v e r ,
and packet p clears node v by time 1 + δ(1)
)). It follows that packet p clears node v by time δ(1).

This completes the proof of the basis case of the inner induction (on t).
We proceed now to the induction step of the inner induction, where we assume that t > 1. We again distinguish between two cases regarding the node where packet p is injected.
• Assume first that packet p is injected into node v.
Then, clearly, packet p resides at node v by the end of time step t.
• Else, assume that p arrives at node v over an edge w, v for some node w such that level (w) < level (v) = i. By the induction hypothesis (on i), packet p clears node w by time t + δ(t) where δ(t) is the least integer such that t≤τ ≤t+ δ(t) C(τ ) ≥ ρ(k + 1) max{1,t−w+1}≤τ ≤t+w−1 C(τ ) .
Thus, in any case, packet p clears node w by time t+ δ(t), where δ(t) is the least integer such that t≤τ ≤t+ δ(t) C(τ )
≥ ρ(k + 1) max{1,t−w+1}≤τ ≤t+w−1 C(τ ) .
Consider now any packet p injected at time step t ≤ t − ρ(2w − 1)C(i + 1) − (i + 1). Since t < t, the induction hypothesis (on t) implies that packet p clears node v by time step t + δ(t ), where δ(t ) is the least integer such that
Proof:
By definition of δ(t ), it suffices to show that Since C(t) ≥ 1 for all time steps t, it follows that
and t − 1 < t. Thus, packet p can be delayed in node v only by packets injected in the time interval
It follows that packet p clears node v by time t + δ(t), where δ(t) > 0 is the least integer such that
as needed. This completes the proof of the inner induction (on t). Thus, the proof is now complete.
From Proposition 3.1 it immediately follows:
Theorem 3.4 For any DAG G, consider the system G, A w,ρ , LIS . Then, the delay of any packet is at most (ρ(2w − 1)C − 1)l(G) + l(G), where l(G) is the length of the longest path in the network.
Proof:
Consider any packet p injected at time t with destination v of level (v) = i. Such a packet has to arrive to v over an edge w, v for some node w such that level (w) < level (v) = i. By Proposition 3.1 packet p clears node w (and arrives at v) by time t + δ(t) where δ(t) is the least integer such that t≤τ ≤t+ δ(t) C(τ ) ≥ ρ(k + 1) max{1,t−ρ(2w−1)C(k+1)−(k+1)+1−w+1}≤τ ≤t+w−1 C(τ ). Consider now any packet p injected at time step t ≤ t − (2w − 1)Cρi − i. Since t < t, packet p clears node w by time step t + δ(t ), where δ(t ) is the least integer such
By definition of δ(t ), it suffices to show that t ≤τ ≤t +((2w−1)Cρ−1)i+i−1 C(τ ) ≥ ρ max{1,t −w+1}≤τ ≤t +w−1 C(τ ) .
Since C(t) ≤ C for all time steps t, it follows that ρi max{1,t −w+1}≤τ ≤t +w−1 C(τ ) ≤ ρ(2(w − 1) + 1)Ci = ρ(2w − 1)Ci. 
It follows that packet p clears node w by time t + δ(t), where δ(t) > 0 is the least integer such that
Because δ(t) ≤ (ρ(2w − 1)C − 1)i + i, it holds that packet p clears node w by time t + δ(t) ≤ t + (ρ(2w − 1)C − 1)i + i. Similarly, we can prove that packet p clears node w arriving at a node v of level (v) = l(G) by time 
Lower bound
Proof:
Assume
, where u is a child of v, as needed.
Modify now the network G 0 (k) to obtain the network G(k). For each internal node v: (i) remove the edge (v l , v) pointing to v from its left child v l , and (ii) add a node v l and the edges (v l , v l ) and (v l , v). Note that the resulting network G(k) is a subgraph of the complete binary tree of height 2k. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the networks G 0 (4) and G(4) providing the labels of many nodes.
Preliminaries. For each node v in the network G 0 (k), denote Z(v) the number of 0s in the string s (v) . Note that the distance of node v from the root is different is
The additional term Z(v) accounts for the number of nodes added in the path from v to the root, which is, by construction, the number of 0s in Z(v) (since a node is added for each node in the path that is a left child).
For packets to each leaf node v targeted with node D(v). The path that is assigned to these paths has capacity C at the
, while after this time the path changes capacity to unit (only the edges that do not overlap with paths that are used for packet injections at other time steps). In order to guarantee that this adversary is a valid one, we should show that the packets that want to traverse any common edge with capacity C at the time of their injection cannot be more than wρC packets. Because the adversary injects in any leaf wρC 2 packets, it suffices to show that any edge is used at most by the packet flows injected in two leaves. Note that if a packet that is injected to a leaf v wants to reach the nodes u 1 and u 2 of the original tree there are two cases depending on whether these nodes are neighbors or not. If these nodes are neighbors, the packet should traverse the edge (u 1 , u 2 ), otherwise it should traverse the edges (u 1 , u 1 ) and (u 1 , u 2 ). For this purpose, the k − |s(u 1 )| − 1 least significant bits of s(v) must all be 1's, and the |s(u 1 )| most significant bits of |s(v)| must all match the corresponding bits of s(u 1 ). This can happen for at most two leaves. Thus, at most two leaves send packets that traverse any edge, and therefore any edge is used by at most wρC packets.
Evolution of the System Configuration. We show here the evolution of the system configuration at any internal node of the network G k . 
Sufficient stability conditions
In this section, we present upper bounds on stability thresholds. We denote d(G) the length of the longest directed path that may be followed by any packet. We still consider the model of dynamic capacities [4] where each link capacity may take on integer values from [1, C] . We first show: ) . For any network G, any adversary A w,ρ and any greedy protocol P, the system G, A, P is stable.
Proof: It suffices to show that any packet that arrives at a queue at time t, leaves this queue by time t + wρ . Our proof is by induction on time t.
Basis case: Consider any t ≤ d(G)wρ + 1. Let p be a packet that arrives to the queue e at time t ≤ d(G)wρ + 1.
The edge e has unit capacity in the time interval [t, t+ wρ ] in the worst-case (unit capacity permits the preservation of the biggest number of packets in the queue). Assume towards a contradiction that p is at the same queue at the end of time t + wρ . This means that for each of the wρ time steps in [t + 1, t + wρ ] some other packet was sent over edge e due to the use of a greedy protocol.
From the definition of the adversary, the largest number of packets that can be injected into the system by the end of time t + wρ − 1 requiring edge e is wρC + 1 packets because C is the capacity value of edge e at injection time that maximizes the number of packets that can be injected into the system requiring e (these are the packet p itself, and the wρC packets that were sent over e). Since t ≤ d(G)wρ + 1, we have t + wρ − 1 ≤ (d(G) + 1)wρ. By the definition of the adversary, the number of packets that require e and they are injected by the end of any time step t ≤ (d(G) + 1)wρ is at most (d(G) + 1)ρ wρC because C is the capacity value of edge e at injection time that maximizes the number of packets that can be injected into the system requiring e. Since we assume ρ ≤ 1
C(d(G)+1)
this is at most wρ . A contradiction to the fact that we identified wρ + 1 packets.
Inductive hypothesis: Any packet that arrives at some queue at time t ≤ t, leaves the queue by time step t + wρ .
Induction step: We now prove the claim for any t > d(G)wρ + 1. Let p be a packet that arrives to the queue e at some time t. Consider any packet that requires edge e and it was injected by time t − d(G) wρ . By inductive hypothesis, we know that such a packet left the queue where it was injected by time t − d(G) wρ + wρ , left the next queue by time step t−d(G) wρ +2 wρ , etc. I.e., it arrived to its destination by time t − d wρ + d(G) wρ = t (since the length of its path is at most d(G), and all its "arrival times" are earlier than t, so the induction hypothesis holds). It follows that any packet that can delay packet p from going over edge e must be injected at time t − wρd(G)+ 1 or later. Now assume towards a contradiction that packet p is still at queue e at the end of time t + wρ . So, there are some other packets that crossed edge e in [t + 1, t + wρ ]. These packets are present in the network at the end of time t or later, and they are injected by time t + wρ − 1. However, we know that any packet injected by time t − d(G) wρ already left the network by the end of time t. Thus, those packets must have been injected in the time interval [t − d(G) wρ + 1, t+ wρ − 1]. There are wρ (d(G)+ 1)− 1 time steps in this interval. So, the number of packets that require e that can be injected during this interval is bounded by (d(G) + 1)ρ wρC because C is the capacity value of edge e at injection time that maximizes the number of packets that can be injected into the system requiring e. Since ρ ≤ 1
C(d(G)+1
) this is at most wρ , a contradiction. In the full paper we show how we can relax the obtained stability condition for time-priority protocols, such as FIFO and LIS. A time priority protocol is any greedy protocol that forwards a packet arriving at a queue at time t against any other packet that is injected into the system after time t. We show:
Theorem 4.2 Let ρ ≤ 1
Cd(G) . For any network G, any adversary A w,ρ and any time-priority protocol P, the system G, A, P is stable.
